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SUMMARY
This Knowledge Note is an outcome of a practitioners’ workshop held at the 
German Federal Foreign Office in Berlin on 26/27 February 2018. Among its 
29 participants were 19 practitioners from West and southern Africa, United 
Nations organizations, European Union institutions and EU member states 
as well as 10 leading researchers and consultants. The present publication 
aims to identify practical lessons learned in civilian disarmament and 
cooperation across borders to stop trafficking in firearms. It draws on the 
knowledge and experience of practitioners at the Berlin workshop in order 
to help other practitioners. Its intended audience consists of people who 
plan, design and manage projects to control small arms, as well as officials 
involved in making policy. 
Bearing this audience in mind, this Knowledge Note begins with the lessons 
learned in civilian disarmament and the trafficking in small arms and 
light weapons (sections 2 and 3). It then focusses on points raised during 
the workshop that illustrate the lessons or adds to them (section 4). Section 
5 reflects on the difference between gun control and arms control. 
In its conclusions (section 6), the Knowledge Note shows that lessons 
learned will only make a real difference if they are widely shared, taught 
and applied. 
A dove made out of collected civilian weapons, Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Photo cover: Christine Bennett 
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Introduction
This Knowledge Note was commissioned by the German Federal Foreign Office and 
builds on a practitioners’ workshop held on 26 / 27 February 2018 at the  
German Federal Foreign Office in Berlin. This section of the publication provides 
an overview of the purpose, contents and findings of this publication with regard 
to civilian disarmament, which is commonly defined as the removal of firearms 
from the population, largely through voluntary compliance. It also discusses  
cross-border efforts to combat the illicit trafficking in small arms and light 
weapons (SALW). In both areas, the report identifies what practitioners have 
found to work well or not. 
Inventory files and smoke grenades within a local armory \ Nikhil Acharya, BICC
BICC \ KNOWLEDGE NOTES 3 \ 2018 5 \
CONTROLLING SMALL ARMS: PRACTICAL LESSONS IN CIVILIAN DISARMAMENT AND ANTI-TRAFFICKING \ SAMI FALTAS
Practitioners stress that with regard to civilian disar-
mament (section 2), careful and purposeful planning 
is needed to ensure that the disarmament effort does 
not cause harm; that it is usefully connected with 
other efforts to build peace or improve public secu-
rity; and that its goals, deliverables, inducements and 
performance indicators are in line with the ultimate 
purpose of the programme. Like all security and 
development efforts, civilian disarmament pro-
grammes must take account of the different needs 
and perceptions of women and men, and how to 
promote equal rights and opportunities for women. 
What is more, it is important to look closely at the 
causes of insecurity and the reasons that lead people 
to want to have guns. Unless these are addressed ade-
quately, civilian disarmament is unlikely to improve 
security. 
Destruction and transparency are of great impor-
tance in civilian disarmament programmes. The 
destruction of collected small arms 1 and ammu-
nition ensures that they will never be used again. 
Providing maximum publicity to civilian disarma-
ment and weapons destruction also demonstrates 
that an effort is being made to reduce violence and 
insecurity. The impact of civilian disarmament lies 
not only in the hardware it removes, but also in its 
symbolism.
Finally, civilian disarmament cannot be effectively 
carried out by peacekeepers, the military, the police, 
civil society or traditional leaders alone. For practical, 
legal and political reasons, it requires a broad coali-
tion of state and non-state actors.
As to trafficking in small arms and light weapons 
(section 3), this is commonly taken to mean unlaw-
ful moving and trading across international borders. 
This is how the term is used in this Knowledge Note as 
well. The first lesson focuses on the fact that in coun-
tries with a high level of gun violence, firearms are 
often so widely available that there is little need for 
new imports. In such cases, fighting the trafficking 
in guns makes little difference in the short run. This 
does not necessarily apply to ammunition, which 
needs to be replaced when a gun is fired. Both here 
and in civilian disarmament, ammunition is some-
times more important than weapons.
Often the main sources of proliferation are domestic. 
Guns and ammunition are captured, traded commer-
cially and stolen or otherwise illegally obtained from 
government arsenals. Better physical security and 
stockpile management (PSSM) is essential both to 
prevent unintended explosions and to stop pilfering. 
Thus the fight against the international trafficking 
in arms and ammunition starts within a country, 
even with a community. It requires government 
agencies, businesses and civil society to work 
together, which is never easy, least of all in fragile 
states with poor governance. It also requires interna-
tional cooperation, which is even more difficult. Gov-
ernments may not be keen to share critical informa-
tion, and state agencies may not be allowed to engage 
directly with their foreign counterparts. And even 
if there are no political or legal impediments, there 
are often practical problems that prevent states from 
working together. International support for training 
and institutional development can help to overcome 
these shortcomings.
Trafficking in guns and ammunition is very often 
linked to other business activities, either legal or 
illegal. These include drugs, wildlife products and 
even the transport of humanitarian relief goods. 
When investigating such illegal business practices, it 
is often very useful to seek the information and help 
of communities living along trading routes.
Most findings of the Berlin workshop (section 4) 
have been included in the lessons learned outlined 
below. However, some other points were brought up, 
for example, that donor countries are keen to con-
tribute to the removal of arms and the prevention of 
arms-smuggling, but often do this without care-
fully considering earlier efforts of a similar nature, 
without properly coordinating their efforts with each 
other and without the patience and long-term com-
mitment needed to make a significant difference. 
Local ownership and sustainability are critical to the 
impact of programmes.
Like all efforts that aim to change a situation for 
the better, civilian disarmament programmes need 
a baseline measurement. Simply put, this provides 
an assessment of the critical factors before the 
programme, which will later be compared with the 
situation after completion of the programme. Here 
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there are two difficulties to be overcome. One might 
think that a civilian disarmament programme can 
measure its success by estimating the stock of guns in 
a community before and after weapons collection. But 
this will not suffice. Weapons do not equal insecurity. 
Other critical factors and performance indicators will 
be needed. And once these have been established, it 
may not be easy to obtain the required data.
It is hard for fragile states to combat illegal transfers 
of guns and ammunition, both at home and interna-
tionally. Chad and Sudan, for instance, are incapable 
of controlling their long borders. However, the Joint 
Border Patrol that they established is doing useful 
work on a limited scale, and its efforts are appreci-
ated by the population on either side.2
Section 5 looks at differences between gun control 
and arms control in the common sense of the term. 
Arms control is international, whereas gun control 
is mostly domestic. Arms control is usually negoti-
ated between states, whereas gun control is mostly 
legislated by governments. Arms control often seeks 
to ban or limit weapons that are considered to cause 
disproportionate harm or to not discriminate among 
its victims, whereas small arms and light weapons 
can be proportionate and discriminatory because 
they are operated by people. Arms control seeks to 
limit military weapons and forces, whereas gun 
control mostly seeks to limit or regulate the posses-
sion and use of weapons by citizens. In view of these 
differences, it is not surprising to find that the only 
legally binding international agreement on firearms 
was negotiated in the framework of international 
efforts to combat organized crime. Unfortunately, 
many industrial states are not parties to it.
The sixth and last section of this Knowledge Note 
makes the point that identifying lessons learned is 
only the first step toward improved practice. Reports 
like this one will only make a real difference if they 
are widely read and heeded by policymakers and 
practitioners. Then the lessons learned need to be 
incorporated into guidelines and training courses 
for practitioners. Finally, of course, the lessons will 
amount to nothing if practitioners do not apply 
them. 
1 This paper uses the terms “firearms”, “guns” and “small arms” interchangeably, although their definitions are not identical. In the context of arms 
control and development, the term “small arms and light weapons” (or SALW) is used, whereas in the context of law enforcement, “firearms” is more 
common.
2 Inhabitants of the Sudanese town of El Geneina (West Darfur) reported this to the author in late August 2013 (Faltas, 2014). According to them,  
people on the Chadian side of the border are also pleased.
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Collected stockpiles of SALW \ Nikhil Acharya, BICC
Lessons in civilian disarmament
In the 1990s, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) became a 
major issue on the international political agenda, and efforts were made to remove 
firearms from society. This was mostly done in countries recovering from armed 
conflict (e.g. Cambodia and Mozambique), countries with high levels of gun crime 
(e.g. Argentina, Brazil and El Salvador) and countries that had been shocked by the 
mass murder of civilians (e.g. Australia and the United Kingdom). Various names 
were used: “weapons collection,” “weapons control,” “gun buy-back,” “practical 
disarmament,” “micro-disarmament,” and, most recently, “civilian disarmament”.
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Definition
This report uses the term “civilian disarmament” 
and refers mostly to post-conflict countries, with a 
special focus on West Africa. It does not dwell on the 
disarming of combatants, for instance in a post- 
conflict project of disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration (DDR). Of course, people targeted in a 
civilian disarmament campaign may in some cases 
turn out to be full-time, part-time or former fighters. 
In today’s wars, the distinction between combatants 
and non-combatants is often fluid and unclear.
“Disarmament” suggests stripping reluctant people 
of all their weapons, but civilian disarmament never 
removes all targeted weapons, and it relies mostly 
on voluntary compliance. Obviously, the unlawful 
seizure of weapons is bad practice. If there is violent 
conflict between communities, it is also consid-
ered bad practice to forcibly disarm the civilians, 
even if the authorities have a legal mandate to do 
so. However, in more tranquil conditions, it is often 
appropriate for the government to offer holders of 
illicit weaponry a period of amnesty in which they 
can freely, safely and anonymously disarm. If they do 
not take this opportunity, they may then risk confis-
cation and prosecution. So there may be an element 
of coercion in civilian disarmament programmes.
Civilian disarmament is defined in this Knowledge 
Note as the removal of arms and ammunition from 
the civilian population. This is mostly achieved by 
voluntary surrender, sometimes motivated by the 
wish to avoid later confiscation and prosecution. It 
is common to also offer positive inducements, i.e. 
rewards, in the form of food, tools, wells, cinema 
tickets, vouchers, tokens of appreciation or cash.
The following reviews some lessons learned in 
civilian disarmament projects. They are taken from 
observations made during the Berlin workshop, pub-
lications of the Small Arms Survey (SAS) 3, BICC and 
other think tanks, programme evaluation reports 
and discussions with practitioners in the field and at 
seminars around the world. 
International commitments relevant 
to civilian disarmament
States zealously defend their right to regulate—or 
refrain from regulating—the possession, movement 
and use of firearms and ammunition within their 
borders. International agreements on SALW like the 
UN Programme of Action, the International Tracing 
Instrument (ITI) and the Firearms Protocol, as well 
as the more general Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), focus 
more on measures that facilitate the control of 
international trade. (See Parker and Wilson, 2016, for 
a detailed and up-to-date discussion of the various 
international agreements on small arms and light 
weapons.) The authors also provide a diagram that 
shows how international commitments affect parts 
of a firearm’s life cycle (see Figure 4 below).
There are several provisions in international agree-
ments that are relevant to civilian disarmament, 
but no clear and strict commitments regarding the 
central issue, the civilian possession of small arms 
and light weapons. In the UN Programme of Action 
on Small Arms (2001) the signatory states prom-
ised to “establish as a criminal offence” the illegal 
holding of small arms (Article II.3). This is not a 
promise to regulate the civilian possession of small 
arms. It means only that if such laws do exist and are 
violated, this should be defined as a criminal act. 
The UN Programme of Action (UN PoA) requires 
the signatory states to regulate the manufacturing 
of small arms and light weapons (Article II.9) and 
to store government stockpiles safely and securely 
(II.17). This latter commitment is important, because 
stopping the theft of guns and ammunition from 
state depots would usefully block a major source of 
proliferation. The UN PoA also says states should 
identify weaponry in their possession that is no 
longer required and dispose of such surpluses, pref-
erably by destruction (II.18). Furthermore, it calls 
for the destruction of small arms seized or collected 
from the population, unless some other use has been 
officially authorized (II.16). Finally, the signatory 
states of the UN PoA undertake to raise public aware-
ness of the dangers of gun proliferation and misuse 
(II.20).
While the UN PoA is merely a political agreement, 
the Firearms Protocol (FP) of 2001 is legally binding. 
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Unlike the UN PoA, it includes provisions on ammu-
nition as well as weapons. According to Article 8, 
every newly manufactured or imported firearm (but 
in this case not ammunition) must be provided 
with unique markings to enable their identification. 
According to Article 5, States Parties must criminal-
ize the falsification of such markings. States are also 
required to keep records to be able to track firearms.
Further requirements for marking and tracing pre-
scribed are to be found in the International Tracing 
Instrument of 2005. 
Lesson 1:  
Do no harm
Like any social intervention, civilian disarmament 
(CD) can have unintended harmful effects. CD may 
arouse suspicions that someone wants to strip 
the people holding the guns of their defences and 
empower their enemies. People who have given 
up weaponry may fear they will become targets. If 
this fear is well-founded, CD may have disastrous 
effects. But even if the fear is unfounded, it will have 
adverse effects. Poorly designed CD programmes 
can stimulate illicit trafficking and the hoarding of 
weaponry by enhancing the value of illegal arms. 
They can also create an illusion of greater security. 
If the weapons were being used, legally or illegally, 
to support livelihoods, then their removal can lead 
to greater poverty. Therefore, CD programmes need 
to be sensitive to the conflict environment and 
planned with great care.
Lesson 2:  
Civilian disarmament cannot stand alone
The removal of firearms from civilians will not be 
useful unless it is part of a more extensive effort, 
and the public needs to understand and support 
this (Faltas, 2001, p. 229). As mentioned in Lesson 
1, CD can even cause harm. The wider goal may be 
peacebuilding, reconciliation, crime prevention, law 
and order or human security. CD campaigns must 
be guided by a theory of change4 that explains how 
the various components and participants of the 
programme will together lead to the achievement of 
the programme’s goal. A good theory of change will 
help the designers detect and fix any faulty assump-
tions.5 It will enable them to create a well-reasoned 
design for the programme. Finally, it will show 
their superiors, their funding organizations, the 
government authorities concerned and the wider 
public what the programme aims to achieve, how it 
intends to do this, how it will measure its success, 
and which resources it will use.
Lesson 3:  
Define objectives carefully
Even if there is ample support for the programme’s 
ultimate goal, there may be doubts about the legit-
imacy and effectiveness of weapons collection. To 
inspire confidence, CD must have clear and realistic 
objectives and must yield convincing evidence of 
their attainment. Similarly, the programme must 
show how the achievement of its objectives will 
contribute to its higher goals. How will the removal 
of weaponry lead to better security? What kind 
of security? Being safer or feeling safer? Whose 
security? And measured in what way? As mentioned 
above, the theory of change needs to be clear and 
convincing.
Lesson 4:  
Choose indicators with care
Indicators enable the programme to provide empir-
ical evidence for the achievement of its objectives. If 
the programme aims to improve safety from firearm 
violence, then the amount of weaponry and ammu-
nition removed is not, on its own, an appropriate 
indicator. 6 A better measure of success would be a 
decline in the number of police reports of firearm 
wounds and deaths in the community concerned. To 
document such a decline, one needs to compare data 
collected before and after the programme. The first 
measurement is called the baseline. A third meas-
urement some months after the programme may 
indicate how durable the improvement of security 
was. But even with three good data points, there will 
be no proof that it was the removal of weaponry that 
improved security. At best, one will be able to report: 
“The data suggest that civilian disarmament contrib-
uted to improved security”.
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Lesson 5:  
Reflect on what to collect and why
Consider the goals of the programme and decide 
what to collect accordingly. Pistols are the weapons 
of choice of criminals and are also used in self- 
defence. Guerrilla fighters and terrorists mainly use 
assault rifles. Hand grenades and other explosives 
are extremely dangerous in the hands of untrained 
people. Weapons collection campaigns in Albania, for 
instance, yielded unexpected types and amounts of 
hazardous explosives and were not equipped to deal 
with them safely. 
If the ultimate aim of civilian disarmament is to 
improve security, CD programmes will need to look 
very closely at ammunition. 7 Guns don’t kill people, 
bullets kill people. Reducing the available stock of 
ammunition may do more to lower the incidence 
of armed violence than limiting the number of 
weapons (Muggah, 2018; Perlstein, 2013). The capacity 
to exercise gun violence depends on the available 
ammunition. Guns can only be fired if loaded with 
the right kind of bullets. And fired bullets need to 
be replaced. 8 We can therefore expect that, all other 
things being equal, cutting off the supply of ammu-
nition will have a greater effect on the incidence of 
armed violence than cutting off the supply of guns. 
Especially if guns are already as abundant as they are 
in Darfur, Yemen or El Salvador.
Lesson 6:  
Choose the right inducements
The choice of positive and negative incentives will 
affect the programme in various ways. What works 
well depends on local conditions. Bear in mind the 
standard of living, people’s preferences, what the 
programme can afford, and what is cost-effective. A 
potentially powerful inducement is the threat that 
after a short amnesty, illegally held weaponry will be 
confiscated and the holders prosecuted. Also consider 
the side effects that inducements may have. Offering 
people cash may be easy, effective and cheap. In some 
cases, it works well. However, it suggests a com-
mercial transaction and may lead to illicit inflows 
of arms if the sum paid is high. Agricultural tools, 
sewing machines, bicycles, cinema tickets and food 
vouchers have all been used successfully as incen-
tives. A symbolic gesture like a certificate of apprecia-
tion signed by the head of state may also do the trick. 
Finally, one may want to offer incentives to a collec-
tive rather than to individuals. Development projects 
are often attractive, but they make the programme 
much more complex and expensive. It may also be 
difficult to ensure local ownership and sustainability, 
which are essential to development.   
Lesson 7:  
Destroy the collected items
Even before the arms and ammunition are collected, 
the programme needs to decide and announce their 
destination. They can be taken into service, stored, 
transferred to other users or destroyed. It will not 
always be feasible to destroy the weaponry, but for 
various reasons destruction is considered best prac-
tice. The people surrendering the arms and ammu-
nition will want to be reassured that their former 
Destruction of weapons, Cambodia \ Christine Bennett
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possessions can never be used against them. The 
wider community will wish to see evidence that the 
items collected are no longer a threat to public secu-
rity. The governments and organizations that spon-
sored the CD programme as an effort to push back 
the proliferation of small arms will in most cases 
welcome a decision to take the collected weaponry 
out of circulation forever. Register all items before 
they are destroyed and publish the list at the time of 
destruction. This invites people to hold the authori-
ties accountable if the items show up later, although 
they had supposedly been destroyed. There are 
various guidelines for the safe and secure destruction 
of weapons, ammunition and explosives (e.g. United 
Nations, 2000; 2001).
Lesson 8:  
Let everyone watch
The successful impact of CD programmes will lie 
not only in what they do, but also in how they are 
perceived. Transparency helps to allay suspicions, 
build trust and provide accountability. Monitoring 
by independent media and organizations will inspire 
confidence. The anonymous but public surrender of 
weaponry will demonstrate that the process has no 
secrets, but respects the privacy of participants. The 
registration and publication of the serial numbers of 
weapons to be destroyed will lend credibility to the 
guarantee that these arms have gone forever. Public 
destruction allows the viewers to verify its finality 
and provides an opportunity for public reconcilia-
tion. The Flamme de la paix ignited on 27 March 1996 
in Timbuktu (Mali) showed how the symbolism of 
weapons destruction can be used to affirm the need 
for peace and reconciliation, and similar events have 
since been held in various parts of the world. 
Lesson 9:  
Consider why people want weapons
If people have weaponry in their possession, that 
does not always mean they have a particular purpose 
for it. In such cases, holders may part with their fire-
arms quite easily. But in most cases, the possessors 
have a reason to want to have arms. If they regard 
the weaponry as merchandise, one could buy it off 
them, but if nothing else changes, this transaction 
may encourage trafficking. If the weapons serve as 
symbols of power, prestige, manhood or maturity, it 
may be possible to ensure they cannot be fired, or 
to replace them by less dangerous symbols. If the 
guns are held for hobbies like collecting and sports 
shooting, it may be possible to limit the risk of loss, 
accident or misuse.
In all these cases, CD programmes will need to 
understand and address the demand for firearms 
before they can successfully mitigate the dangers 
associated with these weapons (Muggah & Bauer, 
2006). The measures employed are likely to include 
information and awareness campaigns, legal restric-
tions and obligations, measures to improve public 
security and settle disputes peacefully, inducements 
for the surrender of weaponry and penalties for legal 
offences.
Lesson 10:  
Engage various actors
Invariably, CD programmes involve various gov-
ernment agencies, as well as civil society and com-
munity organizations. Very often, they also involve 
foreign donors and international organizations that 
implement, support or evaluate the programme. This 
diversity of actors follows from the diversity of activ-
ities needed to carry out a CD programme and create 
favourable conditions for its success. For instance, 
media (newspapers, radio, TV, social media) may not 
be involved in the programme itself, but they play 
an essential role in informing the public about the 
programme, its achievements, its shortcomings and 
its problems. The better the programme can engage 
the media, the more successful it is likely to be. The 
theory of change and programme document must 
spell out a clear division of labour amongst all actors 
involved in the CD effort.
Who, then, will be responsible for the programme as 
a whole? This will vary from case to case, but proba-
bly there will be a need for state and non-state actors 
to share this responsibility. In other words, a public- 
private partnership will often be needed. In many 
cases, community organizations and NGOs will take 
the lead and be most visible. Government authori-
ties will need to be involved when public funds are 
to be used and official permissions are required. 
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Besides, the programme will need state officials 
who are authorized and trained to handle firearms 
and ammunition. If state officials do not enjoy the 
trust of the population, they may need to keep a low 
profile, but their involvement is essential. As always, 
local ownership will be vitally important.
Lesson 11:  
A gendered approach is needed
Generally speaking, physical security means freedom 
from fear of physical danger and harm. But fear 
and danger can mean different things to girls, boys, 
women and men. Designers of CD programmes must 
consider various fears and needs.9 This is best done 
by consulting these groups as early as possible. Men 
do not usually consider the gathering of firewood 
for cooking a security risk, but women in Darfur risk 
being sexually assaulted when they go out seeking 
fuel (Faltas, 2014). Women are not usually as sensi-
tive as men to the symbolism of guns. However, in 
Sierra Leone, a social worker working with teenage 
boys found out that some carried rifles merely to be 
acknowledged as men. When asked if anything else 
could serve the same purpose, one boy said: “Yes, a 
mobile phone”.10 In the course of a CD programme 
in rural Albania, men and women were asked what 
would promote security and development in their 
region. Most men wanted the roads between towns to 
be fixed so that the police could patrol the area and 
people could travel more easily, but many women 
asked for street lights, so that they could go out safely 
at night. Both wishes were granted, and each bene-
fited security and development in its own way (van 
der Graaf, 2001).
Women and men should have equal rights and 
opportunities, but in practice, they do not. Today, 
development and security programmes are expected 
to empower girls and women to assert their rights to 
education, work, respect and security. This is not only 
an obligation for CD programmes, it will also make 
them more effective. At the Berlin workshop, we 
heard of a Cambodian CD programme sponsored by 
the European Union that discovered by coincidence 
that the wives of police officers (all were men at the 
time) could add considerably to the success of the 
disarmament campaign.
3  http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/regulations-and-controls/control-measures/weapons-collection-and-destruction.html, accessed on 23 March 2018.
4 Also known as a logical framework or logframe.
5 For instance, if the goal of CD is better security, then the programme needs to address the causes of fear and insecurity and the reasons for which 
people want to be armed. Removing weapons from society will not always and automatically result in better security.
6 If the number of weapons collected is the main performance indicator of a CD programme, one can expect the staff of a CD programme to give 
priority to maximizing the amount of weaponry they collect, as in the adage “what gets measured gets done.” It is far from certain that this will lead 
to better security.
7 The Firearms Protocol and the Arms Trade Treaty cover ammunition as well as weapons, but the Programme of Action on Small Arms does not  
(c.f. Robinson, 2017).
8 American comedian Chris Rock says a bullet should cost 5,000 dollars. “What we need isn’t gun control, it’s bullet control.”  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VZrFVtmRXrw
9 There is popular anecdote of a European programme to aid the development of a coastal town in West Africa. The fishermen were happy to receive 
more durable nets, but the women were frustrated because they now had fewer opportunities to make money by fixing the nets. Planners had made 
the common error of mistaking the interests of the men for those of the whole community.
10 This was reported in 2000 by a Sierra Leonean social worker at a workshop in Montreal, Canada, attended by the author. In those days, mobile phones 
were still an exciting novelty.
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Lessons in cross-border cooperation  
to fight arms trafficking
This section looks at lessons that practitioners have learned about the trafficking 
of small arms, and how it can be tackled at the national and the international 
level. The dictionary definition of the verb “to traffic” means to deal or trade  
illegally. In the political discourse on restricted products, “trafficking” refers to 
illegal transfers of persons or goods across international borders. This is how 
international agreements like the UN PoA and the Firearms Protocol use the term. 
The same applies to agreements on the trafficking of drugs, wildlife products and 
cultural objects. 
Sudanese-Chadian Joint Border Force \ Nikhil Acharya, BICC
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Lesson 12:  
International trade may be irrelevant 
Often, it will make little difference in the near future 
if the smuggling of guns is stopped. In regions where 
the demand for weaponry is high, large stocks of 
weapons and ammunition have already accumu-
lated, reducing the need for new supplies. The Small 
Arms Survey estimates that there are 875 million 
small arms and light weapons around the world, 
some 650 million SALW in the possession of civil-
ians, 150 million in military stockpiles and 25 million 
in the hands of law enforcement agencies. 11 They 
can all change hands, legally or illegally, and domes-
tic proliferation is likely to continue even if new 
supplies cannot be imported. Besides, some types of 
firearms can be made by local firms and craftsmen. 
Finally, as weapons are durable, their circulation 
inside a country may go on for a long time. However, 
ammunition is different. The more guns are fired, the 
sooner fresh supplies of ammunition will be needed. 
Besides, stored ammunition has a shorter shelf-life 
than weaponry and therefore needs to be replaced 
sooner.
Lesson 13:  
The fight against trafficking begins within borders
The practitioners at the Berlin workshop made it 
very clear that the struggle against the international 
smuggling of arms and ammunition begins at the 
national level. Governments that cannot control guns 
and ammunition on their territory can do even less 
to control illegal international flows. One of the first 
and most important steps towards weapons control 
is to ensure that government arsenals are safe and 
secure. This is vital not merely because the lives of 
government officials and neighbouring communi-
ties, as well as the effectiveness of the security forces, 
depend on physical security and stockpile manage-
ment (PSSM). It will also block one of the primary 
sources of gun proliferation and trafficking. Large 
amounts of weaponry and ammunition are stolen 
from government arsenals.
In the example of the Chadian-Sudanese Joint 
Border Force (JBF), a speaker at the Berlin workshop 
described the useful achievements of the JBF that are 
much appreciated by the population on both sides 
of the border. However, he pointed out that Chad and 
Sudan are unable to control their long and porous 
joint border. 
Another practitioner at the Berlin meeting distin-
guished four levels at which states need to tackle 
violations of gun laws if they are to combat traffick-
ing: Prevention, detection, investigation and prosecu-
tion. In most countries that suffer high rates of gun 
violence, there is a great need to build capacity in 
these four areas.
Lesson 14:  
Interagency cooperation is difficult but necessary 
One of the practitioners at the workshop lamented 
the lack of cooperation between agencies, not only 
across borders but also within the country. It is 
imperative that various national agencies and non-
state actors work together to detect, investigate and 
disrupt networks of arms smugglers. Unfortunately, 
government agencies do not work together naturally 
and smoothly. Some states enable, encourage and 
require their agencies to work together, but this does 
not always work well in practice. Other governments 
actually forbid their officials to contact colleagues in 
other state agencies without the explicit permission 
of their political masters. Border control is one of 
the areas that call out for interagency cooperation. If 
immigration officials, intelligence agents, customs 
officials and border guards do not work together 
(ideally, in the form of integrated border manage-
ment), they will hardly be able to prevent trafficking. 
A lack of cooperation between national agencies 
within a state will also affect their ability to work 
with their counterparts in other countries.
Lesson 15:  
International cooperation is difficult but necessary
If they are to disrupt smugglers’ networks, intelligence 
operatives, police detectives and prosecutors need to 
cooperate across national borders. However, they can 
only do this with the permission of their superiors, 
which may not be forthcoming. Regions that suffer 
from high levels of weapons proliferation and smug-
gling usually lack close collaboration between neigh-
bouring states. This is unfortunate because working 
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together would benefit the countries both individually 
and collectively. It makes the story of the JBF (see 
Lesson 2) all the more remarkable. One of the first and 
most obvious areas in which neighbouring states can 
help each other to deal with gun smuggling is to allow 
the hot pursuit of suspects across national borders. 
That is to say, permit law enforcement officials who 
are pursuing suspects to continue their chase into the 
territory of a neighbouring state.
Lesson 16:  
Train, equip and reform state agencies to tackle 
trafficking
Several practitioners at the Berlin workshop called 
on the international community to help develop-
ing countries to develop the capacity to tackle the 
trafficking in guns and ammunition. Rich countries 
have much to offer in the way of money, equipment 
and expertise. However, developing countries also 
need to help each other, especially if they share 
borders and challenges. Sub-regional associations of 
states like the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) in West Africa and the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) in south-
ern Africa are stimulating joint action and mutual 
aid among their members.
Lesson 17:  
Seek the help of the population, e.g. in border  
communities
In the discussion on cross-border cooperation, an 
expert at the Berlin workshop described how much 
communities living near the border could contribute 
to the fight against the trafficking in arms, drugs and 
other contraband. People living near the border may 
have first-class knowledge on what is being moved 
and who is moving it. Leading a marginal existence, 
border communities may appreciate the interest 
and the help of the government. Hence there may be 
mutual benefits to cooperation. However, people may 
risk violent reprisals if they give the state informa-
tion on smugglers.
Lesson 18:  
The trafficking of guns is often linked to other  
business activities
As one of the speakers at the Berlin workshop 
pointed out, the trafficking of guns and ammunition 
is neither isolated nor unique. Gun smugglers may 
also be engaged in other business activities, either 
criminal or legal. They may use the same vehicles, 
crews, routes and techniques for the smuggling of 
drugs, guns and wildlife products. They have been 
known to ship their contraband on commercial 
flights mainly used for international aid. They may 
have links with corrupt state officials who assist 
them in several of their criminal and legal activi-
ties. There are many links between various forms of 
trafficking.
11 http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/stockpiles.html, accessed on 20 March 2018.
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BICC expert discussing the storage of firearms with armourers \ Captain Budri Adobe, FARDC, BICC
Illustrations and practical experiences in civilian 
disarmament and cross-border cooperation
Germany has two reasons to help fight the proliferation of small arms and light 
weapons (SALW) in the Western Balkans, West Africa and other affected areas. It is 
good for European security, and it favours security and development in the regions 
concerned. As the German government prepares for new international efforts 
to combat the spread of firearms in West Africa, it wants to learn from practi-
tioners who have been involved in such programmes around the world and know 
what works and what does not. This was the purpose of the workshop held at the 
German Foreign Office on 26/27 February 2018.
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Defining concepts
When the UN PoA on Small Arms was adopted in 
2001, there was a lively interest in greater control 
of these weapons. However, attention shifted to the 
wider trade in conventional arms, an effort that 
helped to produce the ATT of 2013. Another newly 
popular topic was the safe and secure storage and 
management of government ordnance (physical 
security and stockpile management, or PSSM).
The purpose of inviting practitioners to the Berlin 
workshop was to ask them which lessons should 
have been learned from efforts to remove the tools 
of war from society and to prevent the smuggling of 
small arms. In the interest of conceptual clarity, we 
need to distinguish between the removal, reduction 
or suppression of weapons in a civilian population. 
If there is a stock of 10,000 weapons in a commu-
nity, then a collection programme may remove 3000 
of these. But one would only consider this a real 
reduction of stocks by 30 per cent if one had evidence 
that the removed weapons have not been replaced. 
One might speak of suppression if authorities 
successfully engage in a drive to durably and com-
prehensively disarm the community, using rewards, 
amnesties, threats and penalties. However, this does 
not mean that partial and temporary successes are 
useless. In Latin America, there is an expression that 
says: “You can never kill all the mosquitoes, but you 
need to fumigate nonetheless”.
Massive programmes in Latin America
It is also important to clarify what is meant by traf-
ficking. In the international agreements on SALW, 
it means unlawful international trade. They tend to 
rule out government-to-government transfers from 
their definition of trafficking.
In Latin America, programmes for civilian disarma-
ment offer various types of rewards to people who 
voluntarily surrender weapons and ammunition. 
Cash incentives can have undesirable effects if they 
are too low to be effective, or so high as to encour-
age trafficking. But used judiciously, they can yield 
good results at a reasonable cost. Some of the largest 
collection programmes in recent history were suc-
cessfully conducted in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. 
Non-cash incentives included vouchers, food and 
tools.
Building capacity in Cambodia
Another massive programme of civilian disarma-
ment, combined with other security and devel-
opment goals, was carried out in Cambodia, with 
financial and technical support from the European 
Union (EU). The European Union's Assistance pro-
gramme on Curbing Small Arms and Light Weapons 
(EU ASAC) in Cambodia was the only programme it 
ever directly executed. It supported the development 
of a new arms law, helped to build capacity for the 
safe and secure storage and handling of firearms 
(PSSM), funded development projects to encourage 
the surrender of weaponry, helped to destroy the col-
lected arms and aided the government in its search 
for illegal arms caches.
Among the achievements of the project were an 
extremely strict weapons law, water wells installed 
to encourage the surrender of weapons, the removal 
and public destruction of over 200,000 arms and 
a much greater awareness of the dangers of fire-
arms. Various lessons were learned in the course of 
EU-ASAC:
 \  In major programmes, quality and continuity 
will suffer without long-term planning and 
funding.
 \  Local ownership is essential, especially in view 
of the political nature of security programmes.
 \  The results of the programme will be more 
sustainable if connected with security-sector 
reform for the long term.
 \  An “exit strategy” is needed: What happens 
after weapons collection?
 \  Collected weapons must be destroyed to ensure 
and show that they will never cause problems 
again.
 \  Awareness campaigns should accentuate the 
link between security and development.
 \  The ultimate goal of civilian disarmament is 
better physical security.
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Building capacity in West Africa
In West Africa, the sub-regional association Economic  
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is 
working with the European Union in a small arms 
project for eight states in West Africa. The EU/
ECOWAS project was launched to fight proliferation, 
make the population better aware of the dangers of 
firearms, enhance local capacity to combat prolifera-
tion and meet urgent development needs. Some of its 
experiences may contain lessons for other projects:
 \  Find out about similar efforts in the past before 
embarking on a new one.
 \  Check whether the people who will lead com-
munity action are trusted.
 \  You need the support and leadership of local 
and national leaders.
 \  You need capable and trusted institutions as 
partners.
 \  “Weapons for development” makes for 
complex programmes.
 \  Both state and non-state actors are needed. 
They must work together.
Weapons in exchange  
for development in Albania
In Albania, the idea of “weapons in exchange for 
development” was first tried out in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. In 1997, the country had narrowly 
escaped civil war when violent protests broke out 
around the country, and the population looted arms 
depots all over the country. For the pilot project, the 
government selected the rural district of Gramsh, 
where the population was believed to hold some 
10,000 military weapons and an unknown amount 
of ammunition. The communities in and around 
Gramsh gave up some 6000 weapons and huge quan-
tities of ammunition and explosives. As a reward, 
roads were fixed, the police were given patrol cars, 
and street lighting was installed in the town, an 
improvement much appreciated by the women of 
Gramsh. At the time, no other rural town in Albania 
had such a luxury.
The staff and evaluators of the Gramsh project made 
some interesting observations:
 \ The government had initially asked for foreign 
aid to buy back the weapons, but the UN 
Department of Disarmament Affairs suc-
cessfully recommended a community-based 
approach using development incentives.
 \ People tended to surrender what they consid-
ered dangerous and useless. Very few pistols 
were handed in.
 \ A large part of the looted weaponry was not 
collected, but trafficked to ethnic Albanians in 
Kosovo, for political or commercial reasons, or 
both.
 \ “Weapons for development” is expensive. 
Programme cost per weapon recovered ranged 
from about US $200 in Gramsh to about US 
$500 in a later project.
 \ The concept “weapons for development” is 
ambiguous. Development is not a reward, but 
a process driven by the community concerned, 
often with some external support.
Storage of weapons before the improvement of stockpile management \ 
Nikhil Acharya, BICC
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 \ Local people appreciated the development proj-
ects, and this led them to consider “weapons 
in exchange for development” a great success, 
even outsiders suspected that the real security 
gains of weapons collection were modest.
 \ The project staff were very poorly prepared and 
equipped to deal with ammunition and explo-
sives, especially in the large quantities handed 
in. Later projects also paid little or no attention 
to ammunition and explosives.
 \ You need a baseline to be able to assess the 
success of your programme.
 \ The Gramsh project should have been part of a 
more comprehensive government policy.
 \ The weapons should have all been publicly 
destroyed.
Example of a marked weapon. \ Nikhil Acharya, BICC
Baselines
Participants at the Berlin workshop agreed that it 
was necessary to have an estimate of the stock of 
weapons in the community where the project is to 
be held. This can later be compared with the number 
of weapons recovered. But this runs up against three 
types of problems. 
1 \ It is often difficult and costly to obtain a 
good estimate of the stock of weapons. It is 
even harder to estimate the total amount of 
ammunition that could potentially be col-
lected. The project will often need to make do 
with educated guesses, which may suffice.
2 \ The number or percentage of weapons 
collected tells us very little about improved 
security. Are people really safer now? Do they 
feel safer? How useful is it to know whether 
there are 2.8 million or 3.2 million SALW in 
Darfur? Perhaps it is enough to know that the 
region is full of guns. In any case, there will be 
a need for additional performance indicators 
to assess improvements in objective security 
(being safe) and subjective security (feeling 
safe).
3 \ The government, the donors and the media 
are likely to want clear and measurable 
results, even if project staff and evaluators 
know that the numbers do not really mean 
very much in terms of safety and security.
Incentives and actors
There was also an exchange of views on individual 
and collective incentives at the Berlin workshop. 
People may be motivated more by something offered 
to them personally, but collective rewards encourage 
communities to work together. A combination of 
both may be best.
All present agreed that it is best for government offi-
cials trained and authorized to handle weapons and 
ammunition to take delivery of the weapons handed 
in, store them and destroy them. In practice, however, 
the soldiers and police officers may not have been 
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trained properly for this job. What is more, they may 
be viewed with such suspicion by the population that 
people are unwilling to surrender weaponry to them. 
In such conditions, there will be a need for foreign 
weapons experts. Besides, representatives of civil 
society may monitor and inspect the work of soldiers 
and police officers. Finally, government officials may 
be more effective if they work in civilian clothes, 
together with civilians.
Disarmament can lead to war
Coercive campaigns for the confiscation of guns in 
South Sudan have shown that ill-conceived civilian 
disarmament can lead to disaster. Lacking conflict 
sensitivity, these efforts disarmed some communi-
ties which were then attacked by others, which had 
not disarmed. The local disarmament initiatives 
that followed were more successful. The lesson to be 
learned here is that coercive disarmament only leads 
to improved security in exceptional circumstances. 
Even campaigns for voluntary disarmament can 
lead to disaster if they are not well informed, locally 
owned and carefully designed to be appropriate to 
local conditions.
Lacking capacity for cross-border 
cooperation in Mali
In African countries with extremely long and 
inaccessible borders, border posts are very rare and 
usually not manned by the state. Sometimes, they 
are manned by rebel groups that generate revenues 
illegally.
Participants of the Berlin workshop noted that in 
Mali, there is a lack of co-ordination in capacity- 
building. There are many different local and foreign 
actors, each doing their own thing. However, a 
national border policy was developed. The next 
step would be to create a national border security 
strategy.
In the absence of an overall strategy, donor states are 
helping Mali to train officials to guard the border 
posts and teaching them to control arms flows. There 
is a good collaboration with the German develop-
ment agency GIZ, the five-country West African 
counter-terrorism force G5 and others.
There were attempts at civilian disarmament in Mali, 
but the United Nations steered clear of them because 
they seemed to be aimed at stripping communities of 
the capacity to defend themselves.
In Mali, cross-border cooperation includes agree-
ments on hot pursuit. ECOWAS agreements ensure 
the freedom of people and goods within the region, 
and there are bilateral agreements with Algeria and 
others. There is a very successful Malian unit that 
combats poaching, even across national borders. In 
contrast, morale is so low in the armed forces that 
many units are on the edge of mutiny. Mentoring is a 
good way to boost morale.
There is a need for donor countries and international 
organizations to help build the capacity of state 
authorities that face the difficult task of combating 
illicit trafficking and disrupting terrorist networks. 
States with major trafficking problems should set up 
independent anti-trafficking authorities with clear 
competencies and a budget of their own. Inter-
national partners should work closely with these 
national institutions to better understand and suc-
cessfully disrupt illicit trafficking networks. Moreo-
ver, donors should invest in the creation and main-
tenance of teams that detect and clear improvised 
explosive devices. It is cheaper and more efficient to 
invest in such national organizations than to send in 
a multilateral mission.
Police cooperation in southern Africa
The police services of the countries belonging to the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
collaborate in the field of small arms control, on the 
basis of a SADC Firearms Protocol. The police forces 
of the region regard firearms primarily as an enabler 
of crime, while in other parts of Africa, firearms 
are often regarded as tools of political and ethnic 
violence. Police services need to gather relevant data 
methodically and carefully. Unfortunately, there 
is a lack of close cooperation between government 
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agencies even within the countries of the region. 
Law enforcement agencies need to work together and 
train together, and their work should be guided by 
the analyses of national intelligence agencies.
Concrete problems with regard to small arms control 
in southern Africa include the porosity of borders, the 
lack of adequate facilities at border posts, unsatisfac-
tory stockpile management, lack of a firearms database 
and the absence of information-sharing on SALW.
From national to international control
Border control must not start at the border. Nor 
should the fight against gun trafficking. Instead, 
border communities should be actively consulted to 
obtain information on trade routes, etc. even before 
illicit trafficking actually occurs. Officials from the 
law enforcement sector may be trained to enhance 
the capacity of border communities to help in the 
struggle against trafficking.
There are four steps in the struggle against  
trafficking:
1 \ Prevention: If states do not have an effec-
tive system of firearm control within their 
borders, they will fail to prevent illegal 
imports and exports. This is the case in most 
parts of Africa.
2 \ Detection: Similarly, many developing coun-
tries lack the skills and tools to detect vio-
lations of the laws against arms trafficking. 
One of the best ways to tackle this problem is 
to start sharing information on crimes and 
suspects, first between state agencies at the 
national level and, second, between states that 
are neighbours or major trading partners.
3 \ Investigation: Here again, the necessary skills 
and tools are lacking in Africa. Law enforce-
ment officials do not even have adequate 
knowledge of the laws they are supposed to 
enforce.
4 \ Prosecution: By the same token, there is a 
lack of capacity, knowledge, skills and tools 
that would allow prosecutors to effectively 
initiate trials of suspected offenders against 
anti-trafficking laws. Here too, there is an 
inadequate understanding of relevant law, 
especially on firearms.
One of the best ways to address these deficiencies is 
training, with tailored technical support.
Joint Border Force between  
Chad and Sudan
Sudan and Chad are two countries that have more 
than once been in conflict in recent years and are 
unable to patrol the length of their porous border. 
Nevertheless, they have been working together now 
for some years and established a Joint Border Force 
(JBF) that is obtaining useful results (also see Lesson 
13 above).
The achievements of the JBF are largely due to its 
pragmatic and practical nature. Unable to patrol all 
700 kilometres of the border, it focusses on the south-
ern area with the main centres of population. Some-
times, it is able to arrest traffickers of arms, wildlife 
products and other contraband and to provide some 
medical and educational assistance to the population 
on either side of the border.
Its modest but worthwhile successes can be attrib-
uted not only to realism, but also to good local knowl-
edge and full local ownership.
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Disarmament sculpture at the United Nations in New York \ Nikhil Acharya, BICC
Reflections on firearm control and arms control
This section shows that while it is appropriate to regard the control of small 
arms as arms control in a wide sense of the term, it is actually very different from 
arms control as the term is commonly understood. Small arms and light weapons 
(SALW) are, of course, technically different from weapons of mass destruction and 
major conventional weapon systems like warships, artillery, tanks, jet fighters and 
guided missiles. They are smaller, cheaper and easier to operate, carry and hide. 
Consequently, they are more difficult to observe, count and control. 
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The problems related to the spread and misuse of 
firearms are mainly discussed in two different con-
texts. One is law enforcement and crime prevention. 
The leading organizations are international police 
agencies and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC). The other context is peace and security, 
and within that framework, disarmament and arms 
control. Here the common term is not firearms, but 
small arms and light weapons (SALW). There are 
many relevant types of international organizations 
that deal with the consequences of SALW prolifera-
tion for peace and security: UN bodies like the  
Security Council, departments like the UN Office of  
Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), UN-related agencies 
like UNDP, regional organizations like the African 
Union or the Organization of American States, and 
sub-regional associations like ECOWAS in West 
Africa and the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD) in the Horn of Africa.
In his 1995 Agenda for Peace, Boutros Boutros Ghali 
advocated controlling SALW (Boutros Ghali, 1995), 
and such efforts are often conceived of as arms 
control. There are good reasons for this, but it can  
be misleading. Arms control usually refers to “any 
international control or limitation of the develop-
ment, testing, production, deployment, or use of 
weapons.” 12 Its purpose is to reduce the risk of war 
or limit its destructiveness. However, small arms are 
unlike other categories of weapons that are the object 
of arms control agreements. This makes their control 
both difficult and different.
Unlike weapons of mass destruction and anti- 
personnel landmines, firearms are not considered 
inherently evil. Most people consider guns, used 
properly and legally, important to maintaining 
public and human security. In many countries, the 
law also allows citizens to have and use guns. Nor 
is it generally true that firearms have particularly 
cruel 13 or indiscriminate effects. Automatic weapons 
may cause unintended deaths and injuries, but the 
bigger problem is that in the ‘small wars’ of today, 
the distinction between combatants and non-com-
batants has become blurred. Hence, the problem 
of indiscriminate armed violence lies more in the 
nature of war than in the nature of the weapons.
Another reason to pursue arms control is the wish 
to tackle the potentially destabilizing effect of arms 
and arms races. Arms control in the common sense 
of the term is international. Typically, opposing 
states negotiate on arms control, seeking to limit 
armaments in their common interest. However, gun 
control is mostly domestic. The spread of small arms 
can indeed destabilize the political situation, not 
so much between states, but rather within them. 
It is rarely the object of internationally negotiated 
agreements. Rather, it is an attempt by the state to 
restrict the trading, possession and use of guns by 
citizens and typically involves the use of the law. 
There are huge differences between states in the 
degree to which, and the ways in which, they seek to 
control guns. 14 If there are differences in gun control 
between neighbouring states, weapons may leak into 
the one with the stricter regime. While gun control 
is mostly a state responsibility, it is undermined by 
the international trafficking in firearms—hence the 
need for international agreements to combat this 
trafficking.
Arms control usually deals with weapons held by 
military forces. Here again, small arms are different. 
About three-quarters of the estimated 875 million 
small arms in the world today are in the hands of 
civilians, and this share is rising. 15 Many of the 
firearms now held illegally by civilians were at some 
time stolen or captured from the military or police—
hence the importance of better stockpile manage-
ment.
An effective state can decide which of its officials 
are allowed to carry weapons, and how these may 
be used. Controlling firearms held by civilians is 
more difficult. Civilians hold firearms for various 
reasons, which are often poorly understood. 16 People 
may want to have guns to protect their families and 
property. They may want to be armed for political 
reasons or criminal purposes. Others seek weapons 
as symbols of power, prestige, manhood or maturity. 
To some, arms and ammunition are simply merchan-
dise. Finally, some people come into the possession 
of guns, for example by inheritance, without having 
any use for them. One can hardly expect to success-
fully limit the spread and the misuse of firearms 
without understanding demand. Various social, 
economic, cultural and political factors influence the 
demand for guns. Good opportunities for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes and adequate public security 
can potentially reduce this demand. 
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Despite all these differences, two important inter-
national agreements on the control of SALW were 
successfully negotiated in the UN administrative 
framework for arms control, under the first com-
mittee of the General Assembly. These are the UN 
Programme of Action (2001) and the International 
Tracing Instrument (2013) (Wilson, 2016, p. 26). 
However, the Firearms Protocol (2001) was negotiated 
in the framework of transnational efforts to tackle 
organized crime, as one of three protocols to the UN 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
(UNTOC). 17 Beyond those, there are various regional 
and sub-regional protocols on small arms. 18
In sum, it is clear that while small arms control is a 
general form of arms control in the broadest sense, 
limiting its proliferation and misuse is very different 
from the established practice of arms control.
12  http://www.britannica.com/topic/arms-control, accessed on 19 March 2018.
13 However, there have been efforts to ban hollow-point (dum-dum) bullets.  
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/dec99-03.asp, accessed on 29 March 2018.
14 In federal states, there can be huge differences between regions. In the United States, Massachusetts has strict gun laws, whereas its northern 
neighbours Vermont, New Hampshire and Maine have very few. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/national/assault-weapons-
laws/?utm_term=.85c1755d50bf, accessed on 26 April 2018.
15 http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/stockpiles.html, accessed on 20 March 2018.
16 There is a need for more serious study of the demand for firearms, as in Brauer and Muggah, 2006.
17 This the only legally binding international agreement on small arms. It entered into force in 2005, but many influential states are not, or not yet, 
parties to it. They include the permanent members of the UN Security Council, as well as Australia, Canada, Germany and Japan.  
Source: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-c&chapter=18&clang=_en, accessed on 19 March 2018.
18 These are documented on http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/regulations-and-controls/levels-of-action.html, accessed on 20 March 2018.
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From lessons learned to better practice
The last section of this Knowledge Note argues that it is not enough to understand 
lessons learned in some 20 years of efforts at civilian disarmament and fighting 
the trafficking in firearms. Lessons must also be shared and, most importantly, 
applied. For the application of these lessons, endurance is key as civilian disarma-
ment intervenes in the way of life of the local population.
 
The weapons inventory is transmitted regularly to superiors in Kinshasa \ Nikhil Acharya, BICC
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When the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO) 
decided to organize the workshop of 26 and 27 
February 2018 and commissioned this Knowledge 
Note, it aimed for a better understanding of lessons 
learned in civilian disarmament. The GFFO hopes 
these insights will be applied in new projects to fight 
the proliferation of arms in West Africa. The previ-
ous sections of this Knowledge Note described some 
lessons that seem relevant.
But it is not easy to learn from experience and then 
use this knowledge to become more effective. It is diffi-
cult for individual people, more challenging for groups, 
organizations and states and hardest of all for what 
we casually call the international community. The 
international community is actually a loose collection 
of states that offer or receive foreign aid, government 
agencies, organizations whose business is to carry out 
state-sponsored projects and groups of citizens. 
There are three basic and distinct steps to complete 
in order to benefit from lessons learned by practi-
tioners the world over.
Identify and interpret the lessons
First, identify experiences that are worth remember-
ing because they contain lessons for future practice. 
They may not be immediately obvious, but good 
project evaluations and media reports may reveal 
them. This may be the first time they are put into 
words. Once identified, such experiences need to be 
interpreted. If they were failures, is would be useful 
to point out what went wrong and why, and what 
future practitioners need to bear in mind to avoid 
repeating the problem. Failure is a better teacher 
than success, but it is often not acknowledged and 
analysed. Individual professionals may be willing 
to admit and discuss their mistakes, but often their 
superiors will not allow it. Project evaluations are not 
always critical enough.
Share the lessons
The second essential step is to share lessons learned. 
Project and policy evaluations will teach the wider 
community of practitioners nothing if they are not 
published. Grave errors, like the coercive disarma-
ment programmes in South Sudan described in the 
Berlin workshop, should be discussed in training 
courses for practitioners, from Bosnia to the Solomon 
Islands. Unfortunately, this does not happen fre-
quently enough.
Most importantly, apply the lessons
Third, unless what is learned is actually applied, 
future work will not benefit from lessons learned. 
There is a considerable body of literature on  
civilian disarmament and the fight against arms- 
trafficking, much of it available from open sources 
online. To date, the website of the International 
Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) is the only 
place where practitioners can seek clear, concise and 
evidence-based guidelines on good practice. More of 
this type of application of lessons learned is sorely 
needed.
The main armourer presents a small stockpile of weapons \  
Nikhil Acharya, BICC
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ATT Arms Trade Treaty ATT
BICC Bonn International Center for Conversion BICC
CD Civilian disarmament CD
DDR Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (of former combatants) DDR
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS
EU ASAC European Union's Assistance on Curbing Small Arms and  EU ASAC 
 Light Weapons in Cambodia 
FP Firearms Protocol  FP
GFFO German Federal Foreign Office GFFO
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development IGAD
ITI International Tracing Instrument ITI
JBF Chadian-Sudanese Joint Border Force JBF
NGOs Non-government organizations NGOs
PSSM Physical security and stockpile management PSSM
SADC Southern African Development Community SADC
SALW Small arms and light weapons SALW
SAS Small Arms Survey SAS
UN PoA UN Programme of Action on Small Arms UN PoA
UNODA UN Office of Disarmament Affairs UNODA
UNODC UN Office on Drugs and Crime UNODC
UNTOC   UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime UNTOC
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